The electricity company disconnected the electric supply in A’s house because of the incapability of A to offset his bills which perceptibly exceeded the maximum permitted time of 90 days allowed by the power company grounded on its tariff agreement. B Later paid off the bill and had it turned back to his name. Later, B leaves, and subsequent bills remain unpaid, resulting in another subsequent disconnection. A sues local power and claims that she was entitled to a pre-notice and a hearing before any disconnection. She alleges that permission to do the cut off in the tariff agreement constitutes state action and therefore the disconnection was a violation of her right to property tantamount to state action.
These matters apply to the substantive due process notion and the bureaucratic due process concept. We may get a state action question in practice. The state action policy is that the stipulations of the Fourteenth Amendment only apply to state performers (state governments and their subsidiaries, entailing local administrations).
A cannot appeal to the 14th Amendment in this case as the reason of action rises due to nonpayment of electricity bills and there has been no discrimination revealed to him by the Power Company. These are the general circumstances that non-payment of power bills justifies cutoffs and A was well aware of it. His contention of property violation carries no legal validation, since, in the absence of bill payment, the question of property violation does not arise. In this case, had the power connection in his apartment had not been cut off; it would have been tantamount to discrimination shown towards A.
The main features in this case was the non-payment of bill, a constitutional obligations, and thus no action can emanate from A’s side. If the cut-off occurred despite payment of bills there is sufficient reason for moving action against the power company and not otherwise. State Action is not a matter in this case, but the non-payments of power bill is. In this case, other matters seem to have restricted legal soundness. State action has been found deserved when a link between the norms of state collides with prejudiced actions against citizens. (State Action).
Intellectual property rights
Al and Betty both wished to autonomously start a business grounded on the extremely warm coat of the musk ox.
Sensational Slick, had a contractual agreement with Betty for creating the dehairing machine in which Slick knew all the data about this machine was confidential, and he agreed to produce the machinery only for Betty and not reproduce, give, transfer, or sell any information about the machine to anyone else.
Slick, gave the information Al’s cousin, Slendra whom he was going out with and she mentioned it to Al. Al offered $125,000 for a copy of the machine and Slick delivered the machine to Al.
In this case, the key matter is whether Betty has any rights to sue Al, Slick or Sensational Slick as a corporation or possibly Slendra for breach of concord or an violation on his intellectual property.
Al bought the machine from Slick even though he knew it was originally manufactured for Betty and regardless of this foreknowledge he is not legally liable for any breach of the contract entered into by and between Betty and Slick because the obligations of the contract are not binding on him because of his contractual exclusion in the agreement. Al is a nonentity in the agreement between Betty and Slick.
Slendra is also not liable because it was Slick who disclosed the information about the machine to her and as such Slick is the only liable person and on whom Betty has the legal right to sue for a breach of contract.
Slick had an agreement with Betty that all the information about this machine was to be confidential, and he agreed to produce the machinery only for Betty and not reproduce, give, transfer, or sell any information about the machine to anyone else but later turned to sell it to Al tantamount to a breach of the aforementioned contract and liable for litigation because there was a concurrence of will between both parties.
On the other hand if slick denies entering into any such content with Betty or denies agreeing to some terms of the agreement such as not agreeing to give data about the machinery or selling the same machine to a third party then with unavailability of proof of the terms of the contract, Betty may be unable to enforce the contract or may be forced to settle for less than the original bargain as her legal rights may appear to be legally constrained for lack of evidence.
According to the intellectual property rights, only Betty has the exclusive right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public. A copy or machine is a material object in which a copyrighted work is fixed, such as a draft, an idea or a reproduced model. A transmission of the technology can constitute a distribution of copies of the work under the current law.
Slick is liable for violating some terms of the contract entered into with Betty by revealing data about the machinery to Slendra and selling the machinery to Al.
Slick is liable for litigation for violating and or infringing upon the intellectual property of Betty by selling the Machine to Al but this case can only ‘hold water’ if Betty has a patent on the machinery.
In this case, Smith had a fore and licensed knowledge about the true status quo of AMD shares which he deliberately withheld from Jones to deceive him into selling him his shares at price lower than what it was worth at the time in the market.
The law states that insiders are required to either to make public their insider knowledge or abstain from insider trading. The possession of inside knowledge and its use is enough to be tantamount to fraud and illegal trading on the part of the insider.
Is Smith, a director and officer of AMB liable for not disclosing insider information to Jones before indulging in securities trading of his Company, AMD as stipulated by the laws governing insider trading under Section 10 (b) 5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934?
Jones to carry out litigation against Smith is must prove to the court that Smith had privileged knowledge on the true status quo of the value of AMB’s shares in the market as at the time they were about to indulge in the transaction and intentionally withheld it from him to buy Jones’ shares at a lower price than their current market value.
In that regard, the AMB recently filed an consulting brief in maintenance of Jones’ appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of a judgment honored in favor of a corporate director In its brief, the finding that the defendant was not subject to liability as he had not assisted in outlining the challenged document; instead the Commission supporters the view that an officer or director who signs a false public filing “with scanter” is a primary violator.
If Jones can prove that Smith utilized his inside knowledge to defraud him by intentionally and deceptively undervaluing his shares then Smith is liable for litigation as per insider trading based on his actions as Insider trading of securities and other types associated therein is severely outlawed by law, in any type or form under the legal eyes.
Ewan McKendrick, (2005). Contract Law – Text, Cases and Materials ,Oxford University Press, New York.
Fehrenbacher, D. E. (1978). The Dred Scott case. Pg. 2. Oxford University Press. New York. What the Court Decided in Dred Scott v. Sandford”. The American Journal of Legal History 32(4): 373-390.